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Wenzhou is historically famous for its entrepreneurs. With disadvantageous 
initial conditions, however, strong industrial growth has occurred in the 
Wenzhou region in the last two decades. In this paper, by applying the 
occupational choice model which involves wealth evolution in an imperfect 
credit market, we try to identify key factors behind the evolution of Wenzhou 
private enterprises. Relying on a probabilistic firm survey that was carried out 
in Wenzhou for three industries (shoes, eyeglasses and general equipment), we 
identify through empirical analysis how the entrepreneurship plays its role and 
what are the patterns of entrepreneurship in Wenzhou that have facilitated the 
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China’s substantial economic growth used to be attributable mainly to 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) in the 1980s, the private sector 
emerged as the new engine in the 1990s. According to Sonobe et al (2004), 
“the heartland of this private sector growth was Zhejiang Province, 
particularly in Wenzhou City. Although Wenzhou used to be a poor rural area, 
it now ranks among the most prosperous cities in China due to its relatively 
rapid economic growth in the 1980s and its explosive growth in the 1990s.” 
 
In fact, Wenzhou had very disadvantageous initial conditions, such as limited 
arable land, poor infrastructure and especially little support from the central 
government. This region seemed to lack all the conditions necessary for 
economic growth.  
 
From 1949 till 1978, the central government only invested RMB559 million in 
Wenzhou's infrastructure establishment, which was far below the national 
average investment per capita. Consequently in the year 1978, as reported by 
Wenzhou Municipal Bureau of Statistics, the gross output value of 
state-owned industrial enterprises only took up 35.7% of the gross output of 
all industrial enterprises in Wenzhou, which was far below 78%, the national 
average percentage of state-owned industrial enterprises. Therefore, Wenzhou 
had a strong tendency towards “privatization” as well as “marketization”, even 
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if this was against the background of “planned economy” at that time. 
 
And yet, beginning from 1978, with the reforming and opening-up policy 
implemented, Wenzhou had the opportunity to develop its private economy. In 
the mid-to-late 1980s, strong industrial growth occurred in the Wenzhou 
region (John, Edward and Shen (2007)). Almost all of the firms in these 
industries were private in nature and most of them are small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). As a result of this rapid industrial expansion, the growth 
rate of GDP in Wenzhou was far faster than the whole country – see Figure 1. 
It was also shown in the figure that the GDP growth of Wenzhou had 
experienced three major surges compared with national average right after the 
years of 1979, 1987 and 1992. We will further explain this trend in the later 
part of the study.  
 




Until the year 1990, according to Wenzhou Municipal Bureau of Statistics, the 
gross output value of private industrial enterprises reached 82.8% of the gross 
output of all industrial enterprises, picking up by 18.5 percentage points from 
the reading in 1978.  Moreover, this percentage reached 92.4% in 1997, and 
had been staying above 90% since then. Notice that the national average of the 
percentage had been only 50% to 60% from 2002 to 20081. Thus, as the center 
of private sector activities in China, Wenzhou represents a very important area 
for the study of entrepreneurship and enterprise growth. Moreover, it has been 
widely acclaimed academically that the major characteristic of the Wenzhou 
model of economic development has been the growth of private household 
enterprises. (See Liu (1992), Parris (1993), Sonobe et al. (2004)) 
 
Why had Wenzhou economy experienced such a rapid growth during the last 
two decades? What were the driving forces behind the industrialization in 
Wenzhou? Focusing on entrepreneurship and enterprises, we will address 
these issues in this paper.  
 
Firstly in Section 2, by applying the occupational choice model, which 
involves wealth evolution in an imperfect credit market, we will identify key 
factors behind the evolution of Wenzhou private enterprises. Although 
theoretical models, with certain assumptions aiming to reduce complexity in 
                                                              




setting, have their limitations in shedding light on the reality, we will tell an 
interesting story on how individuals made its occupational choice to become 
workers, constrained or unconstrained entrepreneurs and how their wealth 
evolves to equilibrium. The propositions drawn from our theoretical model 
will provide motivations for raising the empirical hypotheses in Section 3. 
Relying on a firm survey that was carried out in Wenzhou for three industries 
namely, shoes, eyeglasses and general equipment, we will also conduct 
empirical tests and analysis in Section 3, and examine how entrepreneurship 
played its role in Wenzhou enterprises.  
 
2. The Theoretical Model 
2.1 Framework and Assumptions 
In this section, we present an occupational choice model, some of Wenzhou’s 
entrepreneurial features are incorporated into this model. However, we are not 
going to simulate a comprehensive Wenzhou model in this theoretical part, as 
the purpose is to generally discuss on the impact of entrepreneurship and 
initial wealth on individuals’ entrepreneurial choice and equilibrium wealth, so 
as to provide some inspirations for the following empirical work. Thus, we 
will not specify much on macro factors such as government, institutional 




Our model relates to literatures on occupational choice and wealth evolution 
with imperfect credit market, by referring to earlier works such as Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993) and 
Aghion and Bolton (1997), and the more recent ones such as Ellis and 
Bernhardt (2000) and Buera (2006).  
 
Similar to those literatures, we have both initial wealth and entrepreneurship 
playing an important role in our model. However, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) 
only consider a static occupational choice model while we introduce dynamic 
generations to the model. Unlike Banerjee and Newman (1993), we avoid 
discussion on production technologies of entrepreneurs, because Wenzhou 
entrepreneurs were initially not technology innovators.  Despite having a 
much simpler model here, we reach a similar propositions structure as that in 
Buera (2006).  
 
Our model is closest to that of Galor and Zeira (1993) in setting. While they 
suggest that individuals pay education cost to accumulate human capital which 
later offers higher wages, we in this paper propose that individuals need to pay 
startup costs to become entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial production 
technology. The human capital in their model plays the similar role as the 
entrepreneurship in our model. Galor and Zeira derived the similar curve as 
ours. Their conclusion points to the income distribution among skilled and 
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unskilled workers, whereas ours derives different wealth convergence point 
among entrepreneurs and workers. 
 
For simplicity, we treat Wenzhou as a small open economy and adopt a partial 
equilibrium model to investigate the factors in the growth process of Wenzhou 
private enterprises. Similar to Ellis and Bernhardt (2000), the utility function 
is in the Cobb-Douglas form which ensures that people have constant saving 
and consumption behaviors. As a main input factor, Wenzhou’s labor market is 
featured by surplus labor force with prolonged low wage rate, even if the labor 
productivity increases (John, Edward and Shen (2007)). Hence, we assume the 
wage to be exogenous and consisted in entrepreneur’s cost function.  
 
At the beginning of the economic reform, the entrepreneurs in Wenzhou were 
growing under discrimination and had more access into the unregulated small 
commodities2 market. All these goods were lower-end products that relied on 
“copied” technologies. Firms were taking advantage of the transitional feature 
of economy and initiating institutional innovation. Overall, at the early stage 
of growth, the entrepreneurs in Wenzhou were not technology innovators but 
institutional innovators, a concept that we will discuss about in the empirical 
part, together with Wenzhou’s transitional background and the role of local 
                                                              
2  Refers to small commodities that are with dispersed production, various and fast-changing 
consumption patterns, and not included in the state plan of goods. It consists of articles of daily use, 





We adopt the entrepreneurial choice model under liquidity constraints used in 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989), where capital was essential for starting a 
business and liquidity constraints tended to exclude those with insufficient 
funds at their disposal. However, the setting was somewhat different in our 
model. Owing to their specific social network, goodwill and family 
relationship, Wenzhou entrepreneurs were able to overcome the liquidity 
constraints while starting a business. Hence, even though liquidity seemed 
tight initially as formal financial market was underdeveloped, this informal 
financing actually played a very prominent role. In fact, according to the 
Zhejiang branch of CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission), the 
interest rate in Wenzhou informal financing market was much higher 
compared to that of formal financing. This observation vividly demonstrated 
that while formal financial channels were limited, entrepreneurs had actually 
paid and were willing to pay a higher rate in order to borrow the money from 
these informal channels. 
 
Therefore, to sum up, the following assumptions are made in modeling the 
Wenzhou entrepreneurship and enterprise growth: 
 
A1: The utility function is Cobb-Douglas. 
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A2: Worker’s wage is exogenous, the cost of employing workers is 
incorporated in entrepreneur’s cost function.  
A3: The entrepreneurs are not new technology innovators. 
A4: The entrepreneur may face budget constraint for starting a business, but 
they shall be able to borrow from either formal or informal markets based on 
their own network and reputation. 
  
2.2 Model Specification 
The economy contains a continuum population of measure one, and there are 
countable periods. Each individual lives for one period, and reproduce a new 
agent at the end of period. The preference of agent is traditionally “warm-glow” 
(see Andreoni (1989)) with form:  
1
1 1( , )t t t tu c b c b
 
                          (1) 
Each agent has consumption of tc , and leave 1tb   to the next period as 
bequests to their children without any regard to whether their children really 
benefit from the bequest. This assumption is similar to that of Banerjee and 
Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993) so that individuals are living for 
one period only, and thus and over generations, the evolution of wealth is 
determined by the warm-glow bequest motive that is not forward-looking. 
During lifetime, the agent chooses its consumption tc  this period and bequest 
1tb   to the next period to maximize its utility. Each agent has a labor force one, 
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and make occupational choice based on their initial wealth between an 
entrepreneur and a worker, the former is not necessarily to be a successful one 
(it will also be affected by his entrepreneurial ability, i.e. entrepreneurship that 
will be specified later), while the latter does not require any capital investment. 
Also assume that there exists a critical point b , when one ends up with 
bequest tb b , he chooses to be an entrepreneur, otherwise a worker. In the 
following part, we will be solving the maximization problems for both 
entrepreneur and worker.  
 
(1) Worker’s maximization 
As a worker, one could get a wage of tn ; combined with the initial wealth 
which has safety return rate tr , a worker’s life time budget totals up to 
.  
 
Each worker maximizes its utility subject to its life time budget constraint: 
Max 11t tc b
 
  
                         1,t tc b   
                 s.t. 1t t t t tc b n rb                           (2) 
Solving for the maximization problem above is equivalent to the problem 
below: 
               Max 1log (1 )logt tc b     
                    1,t tc b   
                       s.t. 1t t t t tc b n rb                       (3) 
t t tn rb
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Form the Lagrangian: 1 1log (1 ) log ( )t t t t t t tL c b c b n rb           





                        
(4) 








                        (5) 








                              
(6) 
 
Substitute (6) back into the life-time budget constraint: 1t t t t tc b n rb   , we 
have  
( )t t t tc n rb                            (7) 
1 (1 )( )t t t tb n rb                          (8) 
where the exogenous   stands for a fixed proportion that consumption takes 
up in the life-time budget. 
 
(2) Entrepreneur’s maximization 
The entrepreneurs actually have the same utility function 11 1( , )t t t tu c b c b
 
  , 
the only difference is that their budget constraint changes from t t tn rb  to ty , 
which is the profit after they optimize their production. Thus for 
entrepreneurs,             
1 (1 )t tb y                              (9) 
To become an entrepreneur, one needs to pay startup cost ( )tC  , with 
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' ( ) 0tC   , lim ( ) 0tC   , 0lim ( )tC    . ,[ ]low high    measures the 
heterogeneous entrepreneurship, and plays a critical role in our model. Ellis 
and Bernhardt (2000) distinguished agents by two characteristics, namely, 
their initial wealth inheritances and their personal costs of undertaking a 
project. Different from their assumption, in our analysis, we extract the 
personal costs as a function of entrepreneurship  , which actually determines 
their cost C . This cost includes all expenses incurred during production - 
investing in fixed asset, employing workers, etc. Hence, here we distinguish 
the agents by their initial wealth b  and entrepreneurship (entrepreneurial 
ability)  . The rationale is consistent with the assumption made by Ellis and 
Bernhardt (2000) that start-up costs reflect innate entrepreneurial efficiency 
and are uncorrelated with inherited wealth. Here, entrepreneurship could be 
the ability involved with entry cost, such as the ability to borrow “cheaper” 
money based on personal relationship and reputation, the capability of 
bargaining in a deal to reduce cost, and specifically as for Wenzhou’s 
entrepreneurship, we will also take into account “institutional innovation”, 
meaning the extent to which the entrepreneurs can “work” the state socialist 
system to their own advantage. We will specify on “institutional innovation” 
further in the later part. 
 
After paying the startup cost, the entrepreneurs are available with technology
( )tf k , with ( ) 0tf k  , ( ) 0tf k  , 0lim ( )t tk f k    . For simplicity, we 
 12 
 
assume ( )t tf k k
  and 0 1  .  
 
Credit market is imperfect; formal lending is rare and capital resource for 
informal lending is limited. Based on Wenzhou’s scenario, entrepreneurs’ 
initial funding source include shareholders’ investment, family and 
relative’s support, personal loans, banks and rural credit unions, whereby 
the last two as formal financing channels were very few, and the rest 
informal channels were mainly relationship based. We assume what one 
can borrow is proportional to his personal wealth itw , which serves as 
collateral and adds to the person’s goodwill. Such a proportion is t -1, 
where t  measures the weighted development level of both formal and 
informal financing market, the latter could be viewed as the scale of 
finance pool formed by social network. We also assume that one could 
borrow at the interest rate of tr , which is the weighted average of both 
formal and informal interest rates.  
 
Thus, from both the formal and informal lending markets, entrepreneurs 
could borrow up to the amount of ( 1)t tb   with tr  as the interest rate. 
Give an agent type , entrepreneur faces a maximization problem:  
Max:  
tk  
       s.t:    ( )t t t tk C b                                 (10) 
Form the Lagrangian  
( , )tb 
( ) [ ( ) ]t t t t t ty f k r k C b   
[ ( ) ] ( ( ) )t t t t t t t t tL k r k C b k C b
          
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We have 1/ 0t t tL k k r
       ; / 0L    , 0  , 0L 
  .       
(11) 
Based on the Lagrangian functions above, together with our assumptions, 
mathematically we summarize three occupational choices below: 
Case 1: Unconstrained entrepreneur  
If 0  , i.e. the constraint is not binding, there will be internal solution 
derived: 
1
1 1 1/ 0 ( )t t t t t t
t
L k k r k r k
r
               
             
(12)
           
 
This is the case when an individual has initial wealth above b (value of 
this critical point will be derived later), he could be an unconstrained 
entrepreneur who have optimal investment in entrepreneurial production 







   back into entrepreneur’s profit function:  
[ ( ) ]t t t t t ty k r k C b
                                        (13) 
we have  
1(1 )( ) ( )    if    ut t t t t t
t
y rb rC b b
r

     
                    
(14)
                 
Case 2: Constrained entrepreneur 
 
If 0  , i.e. the constraint is binding, there will be corner solution 
derived: 




This is the case when an entrepreneur is with initial wealth below b , he 
has to borrow to attain the constrained investment level.   
Again, substitute ( )t t t tk b C    back into entrepreneur’s profit function 
(13), we have 
             ( ( )) ( 1)      if     
r
t t t t t t t ty b C rb b b b
              (15)                 
 
 
Case 3: The last choice as a worker: 





Thus, as discussed in the three cases above, the forms of income functions 
((14), (15) and (16)) depend on one’s wealth constraint. It is the initial 
wealth  b that determines one’s occupational choice to be a constrained 
entrepreneur, unconstrained entrepreneur or a worker.  
 
Combine the three income functions (14), (15) and (16): 
When u rt ty y , it can be derived that 
1






  .         (17) 
 
The evolution of individual wealth: 
Applying 1 (1 )t tb y   , 1 (1 )( )t t t tb n rb     to the result of the 
maximization problem (i.e the three income functions (14), (15) and (16)), the 
dynamic evolution of personal initial wealth over generations is:  
1
1 (1 )[(1 )( ) ( )]     if t t t t t t
t
b rb rc b b
r

        




1 (1 )[( ( )) ( 1) ]   if   t t t t t t t tb b c rb b b b
                            (19)                    
1 (1 )( )    if    t t t t tb n rb b b                                         (20) 
 
Here we discuss how the dynamics in the individual wealth evolution are 
determined: 
 
Equation (18) and (20) are straightforward: 1tb   as a function of tb , the 
coefficient of tb  is (1 ) tr  in both cases, according to the initial definition 
of  , tr , it can be derived that 0 (1 ) 1r   , thus equation (20) and (18) 
are straight lines with slope less than 1 and their intersections with the 45° line 
corresponded to l  and  respectively, whereby 
1
1
(1 )[(1 )( ) ( )] 















                 
(21) 
which is derived by solving for simultaneous equations of (18) and the 45° 
line . 
Equation (18) is more complicated,  
1
1 / (1 ) ( ( )) (1 )( 1)t t t t t t t tb b b c r
                             (22) 
When 1 / 0t tb b   , it can be derived that 
1






  , which is 
also the local maximum of equation (19), the same as the value of b , as 
derived in (17). The result demonstrated that the intersection between (18) and 
(19) is also the maximum of equation (18).  
As 1 1 0    , 
h
1t tb b 
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1 2(1 ) ( ( )) / (1 ) ( 1)( ( )) 0t t t t t t t t t tb c b b c
                    
For ( , )tb b b  , 1 / 0t tb b   , and when tb  increases,  1 /t tb b 
decreases accordingly, i.e. the slope of equation (18) has been decreasing until 
being equal to zero when - see Figure 2.  
Thus for constrained entrepreneur, the 1( )t tb b  function (equation 19) curve 
has been increasing on [ , ]b b  until it reaches its local maximum, plus the fact 
that (19) intersects (18) and (20) at b  and b  , which, according to 
Intermediate Value Theorem, equation (19) intersects the 45° line at some 
point due to the continuity, and the point corresponds to w , thus the existence 
of w  has been proved. 
Therefore, following the analysis above, we figure the wealth evolution below: 
 




Equation (18), (19) and (20) all intersect the 45° line, the three intersections 
corresponds to h , w  and l  respectively, where h  is the convergent point 
of entrepreneurs’ wealth level, w  is the “poverty trap” wealth level 
(definition of which will be further elaborated later on) , and l  is the 
convergent point of workers’ wealth level. All of them depend on the level of 
entrepreneurship  , capital intensive rate  , interest rate r , financial 
deepening rate  .  
 
In sum, being deduced from individual dynamics, as shown in Figure 2, the 
economy converges to a long-run equilibrium in which the population is 
divided into two groups: entrepreneurs with wealth level h  and workers with 
wealth level l , the critical threshold wealth level ( )w   is the “poverty trap” 
which distinguishes entrepreneurs from workers. Thus, although the agents 
made their initial occupation choice based on their bequest from previous 
generation, in the end it was both the bequest b and entrepreneurship   that 
determine their equilibrium wealth.  
 
2.3 Propositions 
Now, we have the following Propositions with proof.  
Proposition 1:  For ,[ ]low high    , there exists a threshold wealth level, 
such that for initial wealth ( )tw w  , individuals choose their occupation as 
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entrepreneurs and then become successful entrepreneurs. Individuals with 
initial wealth level smaller than  will ultimately become workers.  
 
Proof: With reference to figure 2, when ( )tw w  , there will be two cases: 
(1) ( )tw l w   : In Zone X: When the curve 1( )t tb b   is above the 45° line, 
i.e. 1t tb b  : tb rises, and this process continues until equilibrium is reached 
at B, where . 
(2) ( )tl w w   : In Zone Y: When the curve 1( )t tb b   is below the 45° line, 
i.e. 1t tb b  : tb decreases, and this process continues until equilibrium is 
reached at B, where . 
Thus B is the convergence point of wealth for workers. 
Similarly, when ( )tw w  , there will be two cases: 
(1) In Zone Z: When the curve 1( )t tb b   is above the 45° line, i.e. 1t tb b  : 
tb rises, and this process continues until equilibrium is reached at A, where 
. 
(2) In Zone W: When the curve 1( )t tb b   is below the 45° line, i.e. 1t tb b  : 
tb decreases, and this process continues until equilibrium is reached at A, 
where 1t tb b  , the convergence point for entrepreneurs, and to which 
individuals reached are defined as successful entrepreneurs.  
 
Proposition 2: We call the wealth level ( )w   the poverty trap value of 
wealth. ( )w   is decreasing in entrepreneurship, i.e. ( ) 0w   . The effect of 
( )w 
1t tb b 
1t tb b 
1t tb b 
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entrepreneurship on ( )w  will be magnified when the financial system is less 
developed.  
Proof: 
w  is the horizontal coordinate to which the intersection between equation (18) 
and 1t tb b   corresponds, meaning when , 1t tb b w   . 





/ (1 ) ( ( )) (1 )( 1) 1
(1 ) ( ( )) (1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 )( ( ))
(1 )
tt t b w t t t t t t
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
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      
      
                         (23)
 
As defined before, ( ) 0tc 
  ,  
1 0









                                              (24) 
According to (23), it is shown that when  (reflecting financial deepening 
level and personal capability to access capital) is smaller, ( ) /w    will be 
1t tb b 
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larger, i.e. entrepreneurship will have a more significant effect on lowering the 
poverty trap wealth level. 
 
Corollary 2: a) More capable entrepreneurs are less likely to be in the poverty 
trap; they would be able to lower their entry cost. b) When the “finance pool” 
is limited, finally-successful entrepreneurs would take more initiative to lower 
the cost and develop their network so as to facilitate its business operations 
and have better access to capital.  
 
Proposition 3: ( )h  , the equilibrium wealth level for entrepreneurs is 
increasing in entrepreneurship,  
Proof: According to (21), 
1(1 )[(1 )( ) ( )] 
   
1 (1 )
(1 ) ( )
1 (1 )




























    




Corollary 3: Ceteris paribus, if entrepreneurs are more capable, their 
equilibrium wealth will be higher as well. 
 
Moreover, based on earlier discussion on the wealth evolution dynamics for 
( ) 0h  
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both constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs, and Figure 1 which reveals 
the positive connection between entrepreneurs’ initial asset and their 
equilibrium wealth, we proved the proposition below: 
 
Proposition 4: Constrained entrepreneurs will start with a suboptimal amount 
of capital and end up poorer than unconstrained ones.  
 
3. The Empirical Investigation 
Motivated by the findings of our theoretical model, we develop two empirical 
hypotheses on the relationship between entrepreneurship, financial constraint 
and firm performance. We then subject these hypotheses to statistical test 
using firm-level data collected from an entrepreneurship survey that was 
conducted in Wenzhou. 
3.1 Empirical Literature Review and Hypotheses 
To summarize the four propositions drawn in our theoretical part, we claim 
that, 1) individuals will need a minimum level of wealth termed as “poverty 
trap” to become entrepreneurs. 2) Such “poverty trap” is decreasing in 
entrepreneurship level, meaning more capable entrepreneurs could financially 
reduce their entry barrier; when their financing pools are limited, the initial 
liquidity constraint can also be partly eliminated by their entrepreneurship. 3) 
Among the successful entrepreneurs, the more entrepreneurial individuals will 
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end up with higher equilibrium wealth level. 4) Constrained entrepreneurs will 
start with a suboptimal amount of capital and therefore end up poorer than 
unconstrained ones. Notice that our theoretical definition of “successful” 
entrepreneurs refers to those who stay profitable in their venture and never go 
out of business.  
 
The main implication of proposition 1, 2 and 3 is that entrepreneurship helps 
would-be entrepreneurs by lowering their entry cost and relaxing their 
liquidity constraint when financial market was less developed. Among existing 
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurship also helps them accumulate more wealth.  
 
The implication above is in line with the basic model setting, which consists of 
some of Wenzhou features in our theoretical part. Namely, more capable 
entrepreneurs could better resolve the financial constraint based on the their 
personal network and goodwill; they could lower the operational cost by 
organizing production efficiently and bargaining for a good deal; they would 
take risks to discover opportunities in the market and work the existing system 
to their own benefit.  
 
All these reasonings above point to the conclusion that entrepreneur’s 
capability brings them to profit. Thus, we argue that entrepreneurship, not only 
motivates founders to overcome difficulties and explore opportunities at the 
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start-up stage, but also inspires the entrepreneurs to take risk to expand when 
the firms are growing  –  such as taking over more market shares, enlarging 
investment scales, etc. In summary, entrepreneurship exerts an ever-lasting 
and far reaching impact on entrepreneurial income.  
 
There has also been long and abundant academic discussion on the link 
between entrepreneurial income and entrepreneur’s ability. Friedman (1962) 
and Graaff (1950-1951) confirmed the existence of a non-marketable factor of 
production - entrepreneurship - which was simultaneously a source of profits. 
Hans Karl Emil von Mangoldt (1855) developed the concept that 
entrepreneurial profit was the “rent of ability”. They argued that 
entrepreneurial profit came from not only the capital use and production effort 
but also from entrepreneur’s risk-taking and managerial abilities. Similar to 
Mangoldt’s concept, Marshall (1890) suggested that entrepreneurship was 
synonymous with business management, and payment for this function could 
be seen as rent on ability. Being more specific on entrepreneurship, Frank 
Knight (1921) raised the opinion that entrepreneurial profit was the gain 
resulting from handling “uncertainty”. His opinion was in line with Richard 
Cantillon (1690 - 1734)’s definition that entrepreneur was someone who has 
the wiliness and foresight to assume risk and subsequently took the requisite 




Hence we argue that  
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurship will affect the profit of a firm. Given 
all other factors being constant, the more “entrepreneurial” the 
entrepreneur is, the more wealth the firm can generate.  
 
Some words on the definition of entrepreneurs. While small firms are typical 
vehicles for individuals to channel their entrepreneurial ambitions, 
entrepreneurship is not only restricted to the persons starting or operating a 
small firm (Carree and Thurik 2002). Enterprising individuals in larger firms, 
the so called intrapreneurs or corporate entrepreneurs 3  (usually chief 
managers), will undertake entrepreneurial actions as well. As our sample 
covers firms ranging from different sizes, in this study we apply the definition 
of entrepreneur in a broad sense, including both founders and chief managers 
who are leading the enterprises.  
 
As concluded earlier in the theoretical model, entrepreneurship will motivate 
entrepreneurs to act proactively in gathering financial resources or utilizing 
financial channels. So to some extent, entrepreneurship can compensate for 
financial underdevelopment.  
 
                                                              
3 “Intrapreneurs” refers to “inside entrepreneurs” who follow the goal of the organization: while 
operating within the organizational environment, they focus on innovation and creativity, and transform 
an idea into a profitable venture. (Jeroen et al (2008)) 
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It is summarized in proposition 2 in our theoretical model that 
entrepreneurship helps overcome financial constraint by lowering the “poverty 
trap”. Meanwhile, proposition 4 concludes that constrained entrepreneurs start 
with a suboptimal amount of capital and therefore ends up smaller than 
unconstrained ones. Given the available data, we aim to test it out that whether 
entrepreneurs who start with more efficient capital levels end up wealthier, 
whether such impact persists permanently, and whether entrepreneurship can 
reduce the impact of financial constraint. Evans & Jovanovic (1989) has done 
similar work by regressing entrepreneurial earnings on initial assets after 
controlling for education, experience and several demographic characteristics, 
and has proven that the elasticity of earnings with respect to initial assets is 
positive in earlier years but not significant in the later years. Given the fact 
that many Wenzhou entrepreneurs started family business with very limited 
capital but finally successfully expanded, we argue that though initially 
bounded by liquidity constraint (which is measured by their start-up capital), 
when firms grow over time, the impact of initial liquidity constraint may 
diminish, with entrepreneurs’ role being important in relaxing such constraint. 
Thus we come to  
Hypothesis 2: All other things stay constant, initial assets of the firm 
are positively correlated to entrepreneurial earnings, while such 





Given the transitional background, as mentioned earlier, most of the 
entrepreneurs in Wenzhou are not technology innovators in general. They bear 
risks for high profit opportunities in the transitional economy. With an 
accommodating local government, they took the most advantage of state-wide 
institutional changes and worked the system to their own benefits so as to 
enjoy the fruits of early development. Thus we argue that, the initial success of 
Wenzhou entrepreneurs was mostly riding on institutional innovation, with 
local government’s support being no less important. We will conduct a 
separate discussion on this following the empirical tests.  
 
The Wenzhou model has generated considerable scholarly attention. Many of 
them emphasized on the transition in Wenzhou so as to illuminate the nature of 
reform process in China. Parris (1993) concluded from Wenzhou model that 
reform was not simply initiated from the upper government but also shaped by 
individuals, households as well as groups at the local level, all trying to pursue 
their pragmatic interests. A similar view regarding self-induced institutional 
innovation in Wenzhou was also shared by Ma (1993, 2004), Jin (2002) and 
Shi (2005). Liu (2002) saw Wenzhou's development as a microcosm of 
Chinese modernization, and discussed on solutions for dilemmas of China's 
political and economic development. In general, these literatures attribute 
 27 
 
Wenzhou’s success to institutional change, cultural and historical contribution 
as well as informal finance.  
 
Although the literatures above shed light on the roles of different factors on 
the establishment and development of Wenzhou enterprises, they attached 
more importance on macro mechanisms than entrepreneurs themselves, as the 
latter needs much empirical evidence to discuss with. Due to the difficulty of 
obtaining the data for private sector, very few studies based their empirical 
analysis on probabilistic surveys. Examples are like Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka 
(2004), who surveyed on firms that manufactured lower-end products in the 
Wenzhou area and studied on how they climbed the technology ladders, so as 
to statistically identify the mechanisms underlying the evolutionary process of 
Wenzhou enterprises. John, Edward and Shen (2009, 2007), using the same 
database of this paper, studied firms involved in the whole manufacturing 
process for their industries, rather than just being parts supplier; their studies 
was broader in data coverage than that of Sonobe et al. By conducting 
descriptive statistical analysis, John et al concluded that with very poor initial 
endowments, the industrialization process in Wenzhou had been self-induced 





However, Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka (2004)’s study focused only on firms 
climbing technological ladders, while John, Edward and Shen (2009, 2007)’s 
study, though with broader dataset, mainly applied descriptive analysis 
without further examinations. This paper, however, with broader data coverage, 
adopts regression analysis to examine the impact of entrepreneurship and 
financial constraint on entrepreneurial earnings. Our empirical work is not 
only tested by regressions, but also supported by case-studies to complement 
the estimation results. Specifically, assisted by information drawn from the 
survey and a study from other documentation sources, this paper will discuss 
on the institutional innovation of Wenzhou entrepreneurs to demonstrate the 
uniqueness of Wenzhou model.  
 
 
3.2 Data Source 
We use data from Center for Research in Private Enterprises of Zhejiang 
Province (CRPE). Here are some introduction of the data and survey 
procedure. 
 
The survey was designed in the year 2005 and conducted in 2006. It aimed to 
study the private sector firm economic growth in Wenzhou over the past 20 
years or so, and to explore the main factors behind the success of private 




Based on the census from Wenzhou statistical bureau (the latest information 
was on Dec 2004 then), 72 firms were chosen to be surveyed from 3 popular 
industries in Wenzhou, namely, general equipment, eyeglasses and shoes 
making. Each industry had 24 firms in two regions (12 for each), whereby it 
was the top 2 regions selected for each industry.  The top 2 regions across 3 
industries included three areas of Wenzhou - Lucheng, Ruian and Ouhai - 
which represented two areas of urban Wenzhou (Lucheng and Ruian), and one 
rural area (Ouhai). Thus, the total firms of 3 industries were divided into 6 
strata (3 industries with 2 regions each), with every stratum contains 12 firms. 
Before this selection, the total registered firms for each stratum were labeled 
by the firm size ranking from small to large, being numbered ordinally from 
“1”. In each stratum, the first firm was randomly chosen among the relatively 
smaller firms, and the firms that followed were picked up by the same distance, 
which is computed roughly as: 
the total number of firms - the randomly chosen first number 
12 1 .  
The rationale is to cover firms of different scales as broad as possible – see 
Table 1.  
Table 1: 
















2, 21, 40, 59, 84, 103, 122, 
141, 170, 189,  
208, 227 (Distance: 19) 
Ruian 630 
11, 66, 121, 176, 254, 309, 







4, 18, 32, 46, 60, 74, 88, 102, 
114, 128, 142, 156 (Distance: 
14)  
Ouhai 292 
5, 29, 53, 77, 115, 139, 163, 








1, 40, 79, 118, 183, 222, 261, 
300, 327, 366, 405, 444 
(Distance: 39) 
Ouhai 459 
32, 70, 108, 146, 173, 211, 
249, 287, 333, 371, 409, 447 
(Distance: 38) 
Source: Center for Research in Private Enterprises of Zhejiang Province;  




As said, the pre-survey sampling was conducted with the preliminary 
information from local statistics bureau in the year 2005. Here we provided a 
table of summary statistics from the bureau before the survey was conducted, 
it was the most updated information till the end of 2004 for the 72 firms. One 
firm with almost every variable reported “zero” was excluded, so it totalled up 
to 71 firms in this statistics. This is to show a broad picture of the sampled 
firms in this probabilistic survey.  
 
Table 2: Main attributes of the sampled firms by industries 
                  (1000 RMB, mean) 
shoemaking eyeglass general equipment 
Asset 20,841.88 8,195.00 12,678.25 
(81,160.93) (20,374.70) (40,533.61) 
Liability 13,576.04 5,779.3 6,394.96 
(52,452.40) (16,614.93) (19,671.91) 
Investment 4,576.75 1,780.22 5,303.54 
(18,933.69) (3,592.34) (19,877.84) 
Labour 202.46 97.43 63.83 
(579.07) (159.39) (154.41) 
Revenue 31,470.42 7,537.44 9,697.29 
(121,470.30) (12,051.89) (23,480.19) 
Profit 1,636.29 240.91 392.08 
(7,024.01) (368.93) (962.78) 
Total obs 24 23 24 
Source: Center for Research in Private Enterprises of Zhejiang Province;  
       John, Edward and Shen (2007)      




The conduct of survey involved several procedures such as pre-survey 
preparations, warming-up exercises, the formal survey and follow-up 
clarifications on site or by phones. The questionnaires were made after a 
pre-survey interview visit of 10 Wenzhou firms in order to observe the basic 
patterns and subsequently design the questions and contents of the survey by 
December 2005. Then a pilot survey was conducted in December 2005, to 
help every investigator to have a warming-up excise in order to get familiar 
with the process, and also the potential problems so as to further amend the 
forms.  
 
The formal survey was started in February 2006 for 2 weeks with the help of 3 
groups of people, each with a professor, 4 to 5 students and a local person. 
The make-up survey was conducted in April for a week to make up unfinished 
parts of the questionnaires of 15 firms in the formal survey. Phone calls were 
also made to firms to clarify information and data. Generally, three types of 
people were interviewed and being asked to fill up different parts for the 
survey forms: one, the decision maker of the corporation (chief leader) who 
may be the board chairman or general manager; two, managers responsible for 
production or sales who may be the same person of the chief leader; and three, 
the workers. 
 
The survey itself included six parts in content, a summary of which is 
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illustrated here:  
 
Table 3: Summary of Survey content 
 
Part Interviewee Content 
1 




Firm’s Growth Process 
(histories, ownership structure, start-up 
condition, product information, 










Basic information of the chief leader 
(Designation, family background and 
individual characteristics, such as 
educational background, age, experience) 
 
3 
Respondent on behalf 
of chief leader 
(if the above 2 parts 
not completed by 
leaders) 
 
Basic information of the respondent 
(educational background, age, relationship 





Production or Sale 
 
 
Basic information of the respondent 
(Designation, relationship with the leader, 
contract with and benefit from the company, 
family background and individual 
characteristics, such as educational 
background, age, experience) 
 
5 Technicians and Skilled Workers 
6 Production Workers 
 
As is usual in all surveys, it was hard to complete the survey for all of the 72 
firms. 2 firms declined to be surveyed, 8 had gone out of business (this was 
 34 
 
only found out when the investigators went to their latest registered addresses), 
and 7 others had moved without updating their new addresses. Therefore, only 
55 out of the 72 sampled firms were contactable, with half of them unwilling 
to disclose complete financial information in the past 5 years; 49 of them 
disclosed detailed information of their chief leaders. In the end, we managed 
to get 20 firms with both financial information (generally have 5 years with 
only several exceptions of 3 or 4 years) and leader’s information available, 
which totaled up to 83 observations.  
 
Apart from the regression analysis, we will conduct some statistical analysis 
for the 55 contactable firms regarding their company development in the later 
part. As it is supposed to be a census of all manufacturing firms, no matter the 
size, but those went out of business were no longer contactable. This sample is 
biased towards successful firms that were larger in size. The first two papers 
drafted based on this survey was by John, Edward and Shen (2009, 2007), who 
has weighted the sample appropriately to address the selection bias.  
 
Following the same methodology of John, Edward and Shen (2009, 2007), we 
adjust sample weights associated with this survey. Firstly we derive the 
sampling fraction, which is to weight the sample back to the population from 
which the sample was drawn. Such a weight is generally calculated as n/N, 
where N is the number of elements in the population where the sample was 
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drawn from, and n is the number of elements in the sample. In our case, the 
weight is calculated as f1/f2, where f1 was calculated as the sample fraction 
(72/total enterprises), and f2 was calculated as the sample fraction in each 
strata (contactable sampled firms in the particular industry-location strata/ 
total enterprises in that strata).  
 
The second step is to use inverse probability weighting, whereby the predicted 
probabilities were derived from logit regression (Wooldridge (2002)), with the 
dependent variable a binary variable equal to “1” if the firm was contacted. 
We truncate these inverse probabilities at the 90th percentile and multiply 
them by the sampling weight computed above to get the final sample weights. 
The sample weights for the uncontactable firms were corrected this way.  
 
All data collected are accessible in database of CSpro.  
 
3.3 The Empirical Model 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) model entrepreneurial earnings as an equation of 
entrepreneurial ability(θ), capital invested(k) and a disturbance(ε) which is 
independent across entrepreneurs and can be a permanent component that 
affects entrepreneur’s income: 
y = θkαε 
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which implies that total profits increase with firms’ size, when the latter is 
measured by assets. As the entrepreneur’s role is to arrange or organize both 
the human and capital assets under his or her control, and most of the 
Wenzhou SMEs specialising in manufacturing lower-quality goods are more 
labor-intensive, we add one parameter for labour Ɩ measured by the amount of 
employee. Moreover, considering the complexity of empirical tests, we add 
one more parameter as the exponent of θ, to model it as: 
y = θƞkαƖβε 
The same as Evans and Jovanovic (1989), we assume ε reflects an independent 
and identically distributed productivity shock.  
 
To test hypothesis 1&2, based on the model above, we provide an explanation 
of firm profit in terms of entrepreneurship of leaders, labor and total asset 
which are collectively identified as denoting capabilities of a firm. In the 
meantime, we control for initial asset, which measures company’s financial 
constraint and individual characteristics including education, experience that 
may affect enterprises’ profit. While labour is the most straightforward 
variable to measure by the total amount of employees, a few interpretations 
are provided here for the following variables: 
 
Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurs are seen as “risk-takers and innovators who reject the relative 
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security of employment in large organizations to create wealth and accumulate 
capital” (Robert Goffee and Richard Scase (1987)). While it is easier to define 
entrepreneurship in the theoretical discussions, statistical work must settle for 
observable features for classifying someone as a capable entrepreneur. While 
present studies are mostly concerned with the entry into entrepreneurship that 
distinguished entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, this paper focuses only on 
existing entrepreneurs.  
 
As discussed earlier, albeit Wenzhou entrepreneurs are mostly not technology 
innovators, they are good at identifying opportunities in the transitional 
background, seizing chances and taking risks to profit. Thus, we adopt 
“risk-taking” as the proxy for entrepreneurship.  
 
It has been widely claimed that entrepreneurs must be risk-takers in order to 
realize their ideas. Prior research suggested that entrepreneurs appeared to be 
more risk-taking than non-entrepreneurs (Shane (1996), Chen et al (1998), and 
Stewart and Roth (2001)). It was also concluded that besides the larger risk 
appetite, entrepreneurs tend to be more capable of managing risks.  
 
As the survey itself did not conduct psychological tests that were 
comprehensive enough to evaluate the founder’s risk-taking propensity, in the 
available time frame 2001 – 2005, we measured the riskiness of the enterprise 
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operation by computing the standard variation (STDEV) and mean absolute 
deviation (MAD) of firm-level revenue over its total assets4. While this 
methodology was mostly used for judging the riskiness of project or a whole 
company’s risk-taking (John et al. (2008)), and given the fact that among 
Wenzhou enterprises, the family-based governance structure was very firm, 
the decision power was relatively centralised in hands of entrepreneurs (John, 
Edward and Shen (2007))5. Thus, we would argue that the risk choice of a 
company indeed reflected the entrepreneur’s risk appetite. As a result, we 
think, this risk measure based on revenue volatility, which reflected the 
aggressiveness of a company’s operation policy, was sound enough to proxy 
for entrepreneurs’ risk-taking extent in a given period.  
 
Table 4 illustrates the different Revenue/Asset ratios and average computed 
risk measure for each of the industries.  
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ijtE indexes the revenue-asset ratio of firm i (belongs to industry j) in year t. That is, for each firm with 
available revenue and total assets for 5 years in 2001 to 2005 (a small number of exceptions are with 3 or 
4 years data), we compute the standard deviation of the firm’s revenue/assets from the industry average 
(calculated based on information listed in table 2, which reflected the broadest coverage of sample).   
We have also computed the MAD (mean absolute deviation from the industry mean) for each firm as an 
















    where ,ijt ijE E  ,ijt ijE E  are as defined earlier 
but such variation didn’t alter the regression output much.    
5 The board chairman master most of the shares; 38.57% of them own the firm independently (own 100% 
shares). Then, for the incentive reason, managers (CEOs and other managers) would have the second 
most shares, who are mostly relatives of the founders. 
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 Table 4: Revenue/Asset ratio and Risk measure by industries 
                  
shoemaking eyeglass general equipment 
Revenue/Asset   
1.509961 0.919761 0.764876 
  
Risk (computed based on standard deviation) 
1.164489 1.846124 1.00993 
Risk (computed based on mean absolute deviation) 
0.983944 1.521752 0.792439 
 
Initial Asset of Firm – Financial Constraint 
Discussions of the effect of capital constraint on firm’s performance are not 
rare. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) relate the family assets to entrepreneurial 
earnings, and detect a positive correlation which points to the conclusion that 
wealthier people could start businesses at more efficient capital levels. Van 
Praag (2002) also tests the effect of personal assets and home ownership (used 
as collateral) on the survival of young entrepreneurs in the U.S. However, as 
pointed out by Praag et al (2005), using personal asset as a measure of initial 
capital constraint ignored the possibility of obtaining external finance, the 
chances of resorting to financial institutions or personal network remain 
unconsidered. Such a drawback of adopting individual wealth as measure of 
capital constraint was further demonstrated by Colombo and Grilli (2005), 
who regress the firms’ start-up size on a set of different modes of financing to 
constitute initial capital. They find out that besides a strong correspondence 
between founders’ initial wealth and firms’ start-up asset, external private 
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equity financing exerts an even larger impact on shaping the firms’ initial asset. 
Moreover, in our survey questionnaires, on the question “what is the 
percentage of initial investment from family asset?” 35 out of the 48 founders 
claimed that they did not use their own family savings at all to start up a 
venture. Their funds were mostly coming from shareholders who were friends 
and acquaintances, followed by relatives, banks and rural credit unions.  
 
Thus, it is obvious that merely personal wealth is not complete and 
informative enough to reflect the founder’s financial constraint.  Start-up 
capital (initial asset of the firm), which is a function of a few factors including 
both initial personal wealth and financing channels (Colombo and Grilli 
(2005)), represents the extent to which the entrepreneurs are constrained 
financially. This measure is an equilibrium outcome consisting of a number of 
economic forces such as degree of capital market development, founder's own 
wealth, founder's reputation and network. It takes into account a possible 
credit market and a personal financing pool.  
 
Total asset – current firm size 
It has been tested in many empirical studies the relationship between firm size 
and the rate of return. Therefore, total profit must be correlated with firm size 




Education and Experience 
Among all the personal information collected for the entrepreneurs – see Table 
5, we consider “education level” and “years of experience” of the 
entrepreneurs as relevant factors that may affect profit.  
 
Table 5: Personal information collected for entrepreneurs 
 
Age 




Years away from hometown 
Working experience: years of working in total, in the industry, in the 
enterprise, in SOEs/government agencies 
Maximum roles involved 
Whether with a contract 
Contract start year 
Type of Salary specified in the contract 
 
The relationship between education and running a business has long been 
discussed with various conclusions. In Paulson and Townsend (2002), using 
the sample from Thailand entrepreneurs, the authors run the probit estimates 
of starting a business to show that higher education increases the likelihood of 
starting venture. Sonobe et all. (2004) detects a positively significant effect of 
education on the firms’ yearly value added, which indicates the importance of 
education in operating business. To sum up, although education may not create 
entrepreneurial insight, the necessary knowledge of it at least serves as a 
marginal advantage for entrepreneurs – such as bringing to them a broader 
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vision, increasing their chances to discover market opportunities that could not 
have been noticed without that knowledge. Moreover, in recent years, there 
have been quite a number of far-sighted Wenzhou entrepreneurs seeking for 
further education, such as studying MBA in universities so as to prepare for 
the expansion of their enterprises.  Notice that the education information 
collected was in the survey year 2005, not the time when the enterprises were 
found. So it would be helpful to take into account such an impact from the 
enhanced knowledge of entrepreneurs. As such, we consider “years of 
schooling” as one of the factors that may affect profit.  
 
Undoubtedly that “experience” will provide entrepreneurs with more insight 
of discovering opportunities, managing risks and making profits. A recent 
theory formalized in Lazear (2005) indicates that entrepreneurs must be 
“jacks-of-all-trades” to some extent. That is to say, he is good at a wide variety 
of business skills while not necessarily becoming a specialist in any single 
skill. This has inspired us to choose “years of total experience” as a general 
measure, instead of “years of experience in the industry” or “years of 
experience in the enterprise”. This “years of total experience” has also been 
used in empirical studies (Sonobe et all. (2004), Evans & Jovanovic (1989)) 





In general, as pointed out earlier, social network plays an essential role in 
running businesses in Wenzhou.  Entrepreneurs would need certain years of 
accumulation for both financial and human resources. Therefore, we argue that 
albeit “experience” itself does not imply entrepreneurial ability, it may be 
positively correlated with the firm’s performance in the sense of the resources 
needed for entrepreneurial accumulation.    
 
Hence, we model it as follows: 
Following y = θƞkαƖβε assumed earlier, taking log natural on both sides, we 
have: 
1 2 3ln ln ln ln lnit it it i itpro asset labor risktaking        
We assume that
 
( ) 1E   , so that  
itpro is the profit of firm i  in the year t , as none of the firms in the survey 
reported negative figures, we take the log natural without further adjustment.  
irisktaking  proxies for the entrepreneurship of the entrepreneur of firm i , 
we take the square of the risk-taking measure as specified earlier (which is just 
the square of derived standard deviation), and multiply the square by 100 so as 
to derive positive result for ln risktaking.   
iinitialasset  is the initial asset of the founder for firm i  when established 
itasset  is the total asset of firm i  in the year  
itlabor  is the amount of employees of firm i  in the year  
 





In the meantime, we control for initial asset which measures entrepreneur’s 
financial constraint, also for education and experience that may have an 
impact on enterprise profit. Moreover, we include the interaction of initial 
asset and risk-taking to test whether entrepreneurship reduces the importance 
of initial wealth of the entrepreneur. 
 
Thus, we are estimating: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln *ln
it i i it it i
i it i i i
pro initialasset asset labor risktaking
edu exp initialasset risktaking u
    
  
    
     . 
iedu  is the education level of the leader of firm  
itexp  is the years of experience of the leader of firm i  in the year  
 
3.4 Regression Analysis 
Taking into account that the firms’ profits are also influenced by the 
characteristics of the sector they operate in, we will firstly address the industry 
fixed effects here. 
 
While shoes making and eyeglasses industries, which consist of firms 
manufacturing shoes and eyeglasses (including sun-glasses and corrective 
glasses) are straightforward to define, we would like to specify more on the 
general equipment industry. In our sample, firms in the general equipment 





lifting transportation equipment, casting machine, packaging equipment, metal 
seal, pump and vacuum equipment, forgings and powder metallurgy products, 
fasteners and spring, iron and steel castings.  
 
By looking at the main attributes of sampled firms (Table 2), we noticed that 
on average, in terms of enterprise scale attributes, i.e. asset and liability, shoes 
making industry was about twice the size of the other two industries. As the 
operational condition was dependent on the enterprise scale, shoes making 
industry was the most profitable, with the average profits of 1,636,290 yuan. 
The general equipment industry was the second most profitable. 
 
The general equipment industry however, despite having only half the scale of 
the shoe-making industry, was with the largest average investment and the 
least labor force. These results revealed that the general equipment industry 
would need more technology and had higher labour productivity, while shoes 
and eyeglasses industries were relatively more labour-intensive.  
 
Thus, we included industry dummies in our regression.  
 
We used the survey data with available financial information from 2001 to 
2005, whereby the “education”, “experience” and “risk-taking” of 
entrepreneurs were constant variables across the five years. Due to the size 
limit of the sample (20 firms with both financial and entrepreneur information), 
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we pool the panel data together to run an OLS (total up to 83 observations 
after excluding a small number of firms with less than 3 years financial data). 
In the mean time we include year dummies to control for time fixed effect. As 
“risk-taking” was a generated regressor, we bootstrap the coefficient of 
risk-taking and recalculate its standard error.  
 
In order to compare the effects of initial assets on entrepreneurial earnings in 
later and earlier years, we brought in the dummy variables to differentiate the 
sample: 
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where (04,05) 1dummy   when year = 2004 or 2005,  
(04,05) 0dummy   when year = 2001, 2002 and 2003 
 
Considering the missing values of earlier years, we classified data of years 
2001 to 2003 into one group, the rest of data (in year 2004 and year 2005) into 
another, so as to make the two separate samples approximately the same size. 
 
Table 6 reports the output for the regression. It illustrates both of the results 
where “risk-taking” was measured by two different methods: Standard 
Deviation and Mean Absolute Deviation of firm-level revenue over its total 




    Table 6
Estimated Effect of Initial Asset and Risk-taking on Profit 
Reduced – form Results 
Variable   Regression Estimates  
 Pooled OLS Distinguishing between  
   earlier and later years, OLS 
 STDEV MAD STDEV     MAD 
Initial asset 0.405** 0.377** (yr01-03)0.397* (yr01-03)0.370*
 (0.198) (0.177) (0.202) (0.181) 
Risk-taking 0.630** 0.605** 0.630** 0.604** 
 (0.283) (0.274) (0.279) (0.292) 
Initial -0.085* -0.082* -0.085* -0.082* 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
D(04,05)*initial asset -- -- 0.017 0.016 
   (0.071) (0.071) 
Asset 0.669*** 0.673*** 0.670*** 0.673*** 
 (0.103) (0.108) (0.104) (0.108) 
Employee 0.527*** 0.521*** 0.528*** 0.521*** 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.147) 
Education 1.990*** 1.987*** 1.981*** 1.979*** 
 (0.449) (0.450) (0.453) (0.455) 
Experience 0.091 0.078 0.090 0.078 
 (0.144) (0.147) (0.145) (0.148) 
D(eyeglasses) 0.418* 0.421** 0.417* 0.420* 
 (0.213) (0.209) (0.214) (0.211) 
D(general 1.311*** 1.320*** 1.311*** 1.321*** 
 (0.258) (0.253) (0.260) (0.254) 
D(02) -0.125 -0.125 -0.125 -0.126 
 (0.221) (0.222) (0.223) (0.223) 
D(03) 0.079 0.081 0.080 0.082 
 (0.208) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210) 
D(04) -0.219 -0.214 -0.311 -0.301 
 (0.205) (0.205) (0.432) (0.433) 
D(05) -0.003 0.001 -0.094  -0.085 
 (0.218) (0.219) (0.435) (0.437) 
Constant -10.542*** -10.285*** -10.484*** -10.229*** 
 (1.514) (1.440) (1.544) (1.471) 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.935 0.935 0.935 0.934 
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legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
STEDV: Standard deviation; MAD: Mean Absolute Deviation; D: Dummies 
Standard errors for “risk-taking” and “initial asset * risk-taking” were derived using bootstrap 
Method 
 
As can be seen, the coefficient (0.630, 0.605) of “risk-taking” is positive at a 
significant level of 5%, which indicates the positive role that entrepreneurial 
ability plays in company’s profitability. Here we will not quantify how much 
increase of risk-taking will lead to the rise in profit, as “risk-taking” is a 
generated variable. Overall, this sign of positive premium for the risk born by 
entrepreneurs has tested hypothesis 1 that the more “entrepreneurial” the 
entrepreneur is, the more wealth the firm can generate. 
 
Without surprise, the results were also showing that both labour and capital 
were relevant to profit. This was indicated by the positive sign of their 
estimated coefficients, with the p-values less than 0.01. Despites the positive 
sign of their coefficients, we will again not be discuss the quantified impact of 
capital and labour on profit, as they might differ across industries. Moreover, 
among the personal characteristics that we controlled for, only “education” 
(years of schooling) showed positive contribution to the enterprises’ 
performance, with its coefficients 1.990 or 1.987 and p-values less than 0.01, 
indicating the importance of education in organizing production efficiently.  
 
The regression also indicated that the intercepts differ for different industries. 
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The estimated coefficients on “eyeglasses” (0.418, 0.421) was smaller than 
“general equipment” (1.311, 1.320), but remained statistically significant at 
the 10% and 1% level respectively. This implied some sort of flat “advantage” 
for the general equipment industry.  
 
Therefore, the test has shown that for enterprises with equal levels of capital, 
labour, entrepreneur’s capabilities, the general equipment companies would in 
average generate more profit, followed by the eye glasses industry. Meanwhile, 
there is no time fixed effect detected as the coefficients for year dummies were 
not significant.  
 
To summarise, when applying risk-taking as proxy for entrepreneurship, while 
controlling for education and experience, we detect positive impact that 
education and risk-taking have on enterprise profit. Thus, this has tested our 
hypothesis 1 that higher entrepreneurship level would motivate founders to 
generate more profit. Specifically, while controlling for labour and capital size, 
it is the entrepreneur’s educational attainment and risk-taking that contribute 
to the enterprise’ earnings.  
 
The results also show that the elasticity of enterprise profit with initial assets is 
positive and statistically significant in a pooled regression. In the pooled OLS 
regression output in the first two columns, the estimated coefficients of “initial 
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asset” means that on average, a 10% increase in the initial capital devoted to a 
business leads to a 3-4% increase in future profit. This coefficient is highly 
significant at 10% level. However, it is not so when being separately regressed 
in “later years” group as shown in the last two column of Table 6, although the 
estimated coefficient for initial asset at earlier years 2001-2003 is still positive 
at 10% level, “dummy (2004, 2005)*initial assets” doesn’t report a significant 
impact (with P value much higher than 0.1). Moreover, in all regressions, the 
confidents for the interaction of initial asset and risk-taking, which are either 
-0.085 or -0.082 and significant at 10%. The negative signs imply that, all 
other factors being constant, when firm leaders are more entrepreneurial, the 
impact of initial financial constraint to profit would be weaker. This has 
proved our hypothesis 2 that initial assets are positively correlated to 
entrepreneurial earnings but such effect diminishes over time, while 
entrepreneurship could to some extent compensate for the financial constraint. 
In the next section, the paper will elaborate on how entrepreneurial founders 
overcome financial constraint in a long time horizon by case studies. We will 
also quote a few statistical results drawn from the survey, with samples 
properly weighted to address selection bias (weighting methodology is 




3.5 Overcoming Financial Constraint  
Estimation results in section 3.4 show that entrepreneruship could to some 
extent elimitate the financial constraint. So how did Wenzhou entrepreneurs 
cope up with financing difficulties in practice? We summarise it into two ways: 
lowering the entry barrier and resorting to informal channels. A few case 
studies will be conducted in the following part to illustrate the two ways.  
 
Wenzhou’s feature has been long described as “small commodities, big 
markets”. According to responses to questions regarding competitors in our 
survey, over 70% enterprises in the survey produce the same product as 
hundreds or thousands of other firms do, this ratio is particularly higher for 
shoes-making and eyeglasses industry. The survey also queried the firms’ 
managers about their distance away from suppliers, their answers convey that 
85% of the firms buy from local suppliers in the same city, with only 5% firms 
import from other provinces. The observations for the two questions above 
were 45 and 48 respectively.   
 
These facts demonstrate that the Wenzhou firms, though in fierce competition 
(with up to thousands firms in the same sector), have formed interconnected 
businesses and suppliers in particular sectors, i.e. specialized and coordinated 
clusters. Such structure enables an enterprise to select among various suppliers, 
rather than being “hold-up” by any particular upstream firm. Thus, vertically 
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integrated large firms are not necessarily very popular, whereas SMEs could 
always find their opportunities in the market, especially for industries with 
relatively long value chain.   
 
A typical example would be a firm in our survey database which used to make 
eyeglass frames. According to the open question regarding the firm’s 
development history in the survey, it was reported that, at the very early stage, 
the firm brought in a second-hand machine that had been disposed by another 
company. The machine was not in good condition, but technicians at the firm 
disassembled and reassembled it in order to figure out ways to improve its 
construction. Based on such “learning from doing” experience, the firm later 
on became capable of making and selling its own machines, contracting out its 
machines to firms at the downstream of the industry chain and producing its 
own eyeglass frames at the same time. Thus, this firm expanded by being 
vertically integrated.  
 
This case shows that, although the initial firm size were limited by finacial 
constraint, as long as the entrepreneurs were daring and resourceful enough to 
start and expand, such constraint could be overcome as time goes by. Indeed, 
clustering of Wenzhou firms decomposed an industry chain into many parts. 
This phenomenon facilitated the poorer entrepreneurs, like the one in the case 
above, to start from a small part of the industry chain which does not require 
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much capital. They could then gradually expand the firm by taking up more 
shares along the industry chain so as to integrate its production line and 
achieve the economy of scale.  
 
Moreover, the adoption of second-hand machines in this case was not a rare 
senario in Wenzhou. At the beginning of the economic reforms, the 
government was still setting a relatively low factor prices for the “in-system” 
SOEs in order to secure their profits. For private firms that were “out of 
system”, it was very difficult to gain the necessary factors of production (John, 
Edward and Shen (2009)). As a result, adopting cheaper second-hand 
machines became a pervasive and feasible choice. The clustering structure of 
Wenzhou economy further provided geographical and information 
convenience for such practice, which also helped overcome financial 
constraint from cost-control side. 
 
Another example was about a shoes-making firm in the sample. Based on 
answers to open questions in the survey regarding initial funding and quality 
control, we got to know that the founder of which used to be a mechanician 
working at factory, who was also a part-time apprentice learning about 
shoes-making so as to fund the poor family. With solid foundations as a 
mechanician, he became capable of making very good quality shoes, building 
up his family workshop and registering his own brand in the mid 1980s. He 
 54 
 
had been hard-working and had always delivered the best products. His 
integrity and diligence have won very good reputation for him. Later on when 
Wenzhou shoes industry experienced the “trust crisis” for their qualities, he 
began to plan about mechanization of the entire production line, which 
required a large amount of funds. His relatives and friends were being very 
supportive, sending their property deeds to him as collateral for loans, as they 
did not have the cash for him. In the end, he was able to borrow 0.5 million 
RMB loan from bank and subsequently became the first wholly-mechanised 
shoes-making firm in Wenzhou.  
 
This was a vivid case that reflected Wenzhou entrepreneurs’ grassroots spirit 
and their daringness to break up financial constraints. At the beginning of their 
venture, their sizes were limited by initial wealth, but such constraint became 
weaker as time went by. This was because, with poor initial conditions, they 
were driven by the desire to get out of poverty; they started from dusty work 
and labored very hard, they won respect from people around, and finally they 
became able to overcome financial constraint through their own effort and the 
support from social network.  
 
While borrowing from banks like what the above entrepreneur did was rare, it 
was hard to deny the help from his relatives and friends, who provided 
collaterals for him. In fact, it has been very common to resort to informal 
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financing channels in Wenzhou. Borrowing from relatives or friends has 
become the major source of funding, especially when the formal financing 
channels are very limited for private SMEs.  
 
Table 7 illustrates the source of initial funding of 50 firms in our survey. Note 
that these firms were properly weighted to address the selection bias, details of 
the weighting methodology is indicated in section 3.2. The survey question 
was designed to post a few funding options for respondents, and they 
answered “yes” for each option if it was one source of their firm’s initial 
funding. In this way, a few firms made multiple choices for their initial 
funding source. It can be told that shareholders’ investment tops all options 
(taking up 74% of all firms), followed by family (38%), which includes both 
direct relatives and indirect relatives. Only 10% of the total resorted to banks 
and 4% to rural credit unions. Thus, such borrowing and lending were mostly 
based on mutual trust and goodwill of the borrower, which have been 
important in Wenzhou’s business environment.  
 
Table 7 Source of Initial Funding for entrepreneurs 
  Proportions No. of observations 
Shareholders 0.74 35 
 (0.10)  
Family  0.38 18 
 (0.08)  
Other personal loans  0.02 1 
 (0.02)  
Banks  0.11 4 
 (0.05)  
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Informal loans  0.02 1 
 (0.02)  
Rural Credit Unions 0.04 2 
 (0.02)  
   
Note: Total number of observations is 50, with multiple choices of some  
respondents. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 Source: Center for Research in Private Enterprises of Zhejiang Province;  
        John, Edward and Shen (2007)      
3.6 Transitional Background and Institutional Innovation 
We have shown that their entrepreneurial capabilities are critical to the success 
of Wenzhou entrepreneurs, in part by helping them over the financial 
constraint they face. In this section, we enrich the story told by the statistical 
results by adding institutional texture to it. The Wenzhou success took place as 
China underwent an institutional transformation from a centrally planned 
economy to one in which market forces have been playing an increasingly 
important role. The Wenzhou entrepreneurs distinguished themselves in this 
transition process by pioneering numerous institutional innovations that 
pushed back the constraints imposed by the old system.  
 
The reform on economic system or enterprise system brings innovation for 
production, decision-making as well as incentive mechanism, so as to improve 
the productivity and efficiency of enterprises ultimately. While it is not 
surprising for an entrepreneur to adjust his business model to adapt to 
changing economic circumstances to survive (A.A. Ligthelm (2010)), it is 
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interesting to look into how the Wenzhou entrepreneurs affected the prevailing 
policy then. How did they proactively take advantage of the economic reform 
and initiate institutional innovation in the transitional background. In other 
words, while China’s reforms have been universally taking a “top-down” path, 
it is interesting to see how Wenzhou entrepreneurs initiated the “bottom-up” 
institutional change.  
 
In this section, to address the above mentioned topic, we conducted some 
statistical analysis based on the survey database. These 55 contactable 
enterprises responded to the survey questionnaires and their responses (though 
not complete) were indexed and input into the database. A number of 
statistical information provided in the following part is generated from this 
database by STATA.  
 
To discuss on Wenzhou entrepreneur’s institutional innovation, it is no less 
important to pay attention to macro background as well as the local situation 
that make Wenzhou entrepreneurs stand out. While debates on who is the key 
player - the government or entrepreneurs - in the Wenzhou model were being 
widely conducted, we would like to take a more balanced view that both of 
them contributed to Wenzhou’s success, with more initiatives from 




1) National Background 
In the late 1970s, the state encouraged that “the individual or private petty 
commodity economy could serve as a way of filling in the gaps left by the 
state and collectives.” 6  When Deng Xiaoping proposed Reform & 
Opening-up policy in the year 1979, individuals or household industrial and 
commercial firms began to take the form of “hang-on household (guahu)” or 
“wearing a red hat” (Parris (1993)). They were de facto private enterprises but 
attached to or registered as collective ones. It was such deviating practices of 
“hang-on” and “red hat” arrangements, based on Wenzhou’s deeply embedded 
family businesses, that built up the first step for the booming private economy 
in Wenzhou.  
 
Subsequently, in the year 1986, economic reform “experimental plots” began 
to be conducted nationwide, and Wenzhou became one of them. Alongside the 
relaxing of restrictions on the development of private economy, many family 
enterprises were transformed into “stock cooperation system enterprises” 
ready for expansion (Wei et all (2007)).  
 
When it came to the year 1992 when Deng Xiaoping made his Southern Tour 
and revitalised the reform process, many private enterprises began to reform 
on the optimization of equity structure, turning the previous “stock 
                                                              
6 See then-Premier Hua Guofeng’s report to the 15th National People’s Congress in February 1978 for 
the initial re-endorsement of the private sector. This was also quoted by Parris (1993).  
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cooperation system enterprise” into “Limited Liability Company” (Jin (2002)). 
Since then, according to Wei et all (2007), “great efforts have been made to 
improve competitiveness through mergers, acquisitions, spatial expansion and 
the development of conglomerations and multiregional enterprises.”  
 
2) Family Business Environment and Supportive Government 
While the reform was nationwide, Wenzhou with its unique features was well 
positioned to benefit sufficiently from the national policy and take the lead to 
practice institutional innovation. Firstly, Wenzhou’s traditional value of 
mercantilism and the pervasion of family-owned small businesses provided a 
strong basis for its rapid development of private economy: Wenzhou 
experienced much less “friction cost” in both emancipating people’s mind and 
breaking institutional constraints in the development of private businesses;  
 
Wenzhou people are generally motivated to be self-employed. In addition, as 
we have referenced in the background section, the private economy scale has 
been well above the national average in terms of percentage to the gross 
output value. The lower SOE ratio in Wenzhou has resulted in less resource 
occupation, leaving plenty of opportunities for private enterprises to boom.  
 
In this regards, the government has actually played an accommodating role. 
Wenzhou entrepreneurs sufficiently enjoyed the ease of setting up and 
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operating their private businesses. Based on the survey data, we have 
produced a few tables showing the survey respondents’ evaluation of their 
business environment. Table 8 categorizes the surveyed firms by ownership 
when they were established with the industrial and commercial bureau. Again 
the survey samples were properly weighted using methodology specified in 
section 3.2. As shown, almost all of the firms were started as private business 
(privately owned, partnership, or equity-owned totaled up to 97% of the whole 
sample) and remained so until the survey year. Two of the firms were started 
as collective, but they were actually “red hat” firms founded before 1985 and 
were actually private in substance. (“Red hats” referred to enterprises 
registered as collectives but were virtually private entities). Note that these 
firms which used to “guahu” (attach themselves to collectives) before were not 
registered with industrial and commercial bureau but with these collectives7. 
In our sample, there were firms used to “guahu” but subsequently registered 
with the bureau as private-owned when business environment became more 
friendly to them, such detail before their “official” registration as 
private-owned was not specified in our statistics as the survey didn’t 




7 Guahu is a type of operation mode rather than ownership form. To reduce administrative difficulties 
and enhance operation efficiency for government departments, these “guahu” firms in Wenzhou were 
managed by these collectives instead of industrial and commercial bureau. Each collective may be 
attached by up to a hundred family workshops. (Huang Zhengrui, “New Thinkings for Regional 
Economic Development”, Hunan people’s Press, 1988) 
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Table 8 Enterprise Ownership when established 
    Proportions No. of observations 
Collective 0.0342 2 
 (-0.0237)  
Privately owned(sole)  0.5696 31 
 (-0.0844)  
Partnership  0.2105 9 
 (-0.1001)  
Share-owned (private) 0.1856 12 
 (-0.0567)  
Total 1 54 
   
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 
Based on answers to questions regarding the ease of doing business and 
dealing with government, more than 80% of firms considered it “easy” or 
“very easy” to obtain a business license, while none of them reported it was 
“difficult” to do so. Meanwhile, when being asked how many days spent 
dealing with government in a year, above 90% surveyed firms reported “little” 
time they had to spend in a year dealing with government for policy or law 
matters. The total observations for the two questions above were 55 and 42 
respectively.  
 
The facts above reflected that Wenzhou entrepreneurs experienced little 
headwinds in terms of starting up businesses and dealing with the government. 
In fact, Wenzhou government was not taking a purely laissez-faire approach, 
but also being active whenever needed. A good example would be when 
enterprises sought for legitimacy by “guahu”, local governments not only gave 
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them green light, but also facilitated such practices by implementing regulatory 
remedies to protect them. The 1987 Document that stipulated “temporary 
regulation on issues concerning rural shareholder cooperative”, was another 
evidence that the Wenzhou government proactively involved in the local 
economic development. Moreover, alongside the nationwide reform and 
Wenzhou’s rapid economic development in the 1990s, “Wenzhou” model 
received more political approval from the central government. This further 
paved the way for local leaders to liberate their mindset and strengthen their 
roles in supporting entrepreneurial activities.  
 
With these observations, we detected that Wenzhou government was 
supportive to private enterprises. The government never held them back from 
development, instead it eliminated policy barriers for them. Such actions had 
stimulated a broad entrepreneurial base.  
 
3) Dealing with Ownership Issue  
Although conducting private businesses following the reform was not 
uncommon in China, Wenzhou entrepreneurs were particularly intelligent in 
“working” the system to their own advantages besides taking the lead in this 
nationwide reform. With fewer barriers in both ideology and government 
policies, originating from their traditional family business origin, Wenzhou 




“Hang-on” households, known as “guahu” in Mandarin, was the earliest 
innovation initiated by Wenzhou entrepreneurs (Zhang (2008), Parris (1993)). 
This earliest practice originated from a stationery factory in the rural area in 
Wenzhou. Based on information provided by the Trade Union of Cangnan, a 
county of Wenzhou, the earliest “guahu” practice happened in a 
collectively-owned enterprise producing school badge and plastic sheet meal 
ticket. The egalitarianism practice under such ownership structure made 
people very demotivated, and the enterprise’s performance had been lackluster. 
In the year of 1979, the factory conducted a reform by splitting itself into four 
subsidiaries, each conducted production, sales and business accounting 
independently, but other things such as company name, bank account, tax 
paying and royalties paying were unified. Apart from paying a certain amount 
of profit to their “headquarter”, they could retain the rest of the earnings in 
their own branch. Such an arrangement substantially enhanced each 
subsidiary’s incentive, as it was left to them to decide how much they would 
like to earn. Thus, they started to improve the production and tried very hard 
developing business. At the end of the day, the enterprise became very 
profitable and served as an early form of “hang-on” practice. Many then 
collectively-owned enterprises began to copy such model, and household 
enterprises began to attach themselves to Collectives or State Unite.  In some 
of the places in Wenzhou, over 90% of family businesses adopted this practice 
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(Huang (1986)) in order to receive legitimacy and reduce bureaucratic 
procedures. This practice gradually spread to other parts of the country in the 
1980s (Parris (1993)). Thus, “guahu” as an important institutional innovation 
on business operation practice, had stimulated very broad entrepreneurial 
activities in Wenzhou and built up a basis for the development of private 
economy.  
 
As the first and foremost innovation by Wenzhou entrepreneurs, “guahu” also 
created conflicts between the two parties as they were not protected by law. So 
in 1987, the Wenzhou city government made two guidelines to regulate guahu 
and subsequently issued another regulation about tax collection under the 
guahu arrangement (Zhang 2008). This was a typical example showing how 
Wenzhou entrepreneurs self-induced institutional change i.e. from reforming 
at the micro entities till affecting government policies, in sum, how they have 
initiated the bottom-up institutional innovation.  
 
Another example would be the emergence of “shareholder cooperative”. 
Cooperation among individual entrepreneurs or households became common 
when individual entrepreneurs realised their limit in resources. Various forms 
of cooperation mushroomed in the 1980s and surged after the “1987 
Document” mentioned earlier, the first local regulation in China with regards 
to shareholder cooperative ownership structure. Wenzhou government defined 
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that “shareholder cooperative” could be treated the same as collectively owned 
enterprise, as long as the firms were registered under more than one person’s 
name. Such a definition motivated many Wenzhou founders to take advantage 
of it, dividing their shares among family members and registered their 
businesses as “shareholder cooperative”. In such scenario, the pervasive 
family business in Wenzhou became important predecessors for the surging 
shareholder cooperatives. This is another typical case of Wenzhou 
entrepreneurs “work the system to their own benefit”.  
 
It is clear to see that Wenzhou entrepreneurs practically replaced the vague 
delimitation of property rights under state ownership with a clearer and more 
exclusive private-dominated property order: from the heydays of “hang-on” 
households (from late 70s), to “stock cooperation system enterprise” which 
appeared after the 13th national Congress of the CCP (in 1987), then to 
“Limited Liability Company”, which emerged after Deng’s southern tour (in 
1992) and further optimized private firm’s ownership structure. Wenzhou 
entrepreneurs had been very proactive in changing the existing institutions. 
According to Parris (1993), “the development of the Wenzhou model was the 
result of conflict, accommodation and chronic negotiation among ordinary 
members of local society and the agents of the local and central state.”  
 
The argument above has also well explained the trend shown earlier in Figure 
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1 of Section 1. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
in the year 1979，the 13th National Congress of the CCP (Chinese Communist 
Party) before and after 1986, and the speech that Deng Xiaoping made during 
his southern tour in 1992 - all have brought Wenzhou the momentum of 
self-induced institutional innovation, with significantly improved productivity 
and increased private capital, Wenzhou’s growth rate of GDP far exceeded the 
national average during the above mentioned three periods.   
 
In summary, it is demonstrated that the transitional background and 
Wenzhou’s own features – supportive government and pervasive family 
business – were playing an important role in shaping the patterns of 
institutional innovation in Wenzhou. While attributing the essence of Wenzhou 
model to a system of production that is centered on private enterprises, 
transitional nature of reform undoubtedly enables Wenzhou entrepreneurs to 
enjoy institutional-gap advantages. Hence, the initial success of Wenzhou 
entrepreneurs was mostly riding on institutional innovation, with local 
government’s role being no less important. However, such benefits from 
institutional innovation are limited as the transitional economy is only 
temporary, to sustain the fast growth of economy, these enterprises are more in 
need of strategic changes, such as technological upgrading, branding the 
product to a broader region, or switching to a more modernised managerial 





This paper firstly discusses the theory of how entrepreneurship and financial 
constraint play their roles in the growth path of enterprises. By applying the 
occupational choice model which serve as a crude approximation of Wenzhou 
model, we classify individuals into three categories, namely unconstrained 
entrepreneurs, constrained entrepreneurs and wage workers, we solve for 
individual’s maximization problem and derive the dynamics for the wealth 
evolution of individuals. Based on a phase diagram analysis and mathematical 
proof, we conclude that, one, individuals will need a minimum level of wealth 
termed as “poverty trap” to become entrepreneurs. Two, such “poverty trap” is 
decreasing in entrepreneurship level, meaning more capable entrepreneurs 
could lower their entry barrier financially; when their financing pools are 
limited, such an initial liquidity constraint can also be partly eliminated by 
their entrepreneurship. Three, among the successful entrepreneurs, the more 
entrepreneurial individuals will end up with higher equilibrium wealth level. 
Four, constrained entrepreneurs will start with a suboptimal amount of capital 
and therefore end up poorer than unconstrained ones. These results serve as 
motivations for the hypotheses raised in the empirical part.  
 
Motivated by the propositions drawn from theoretical models and based on the 
Wenzhou enterprises data, we build up two hypotheses in relation to 
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entrepreneurship and financial constraint and their impacts on entrepreneurial 
earnings. Firstly, given all other factors being constant, the more 
“entrepreneurial” the entrepreneur is, the more wealth the firm can generate. 
On the other hand, initial assets of firms are positively correlated to 
entrepreneurial earnings, while such impact diminishes over time and could be 
partly offset by entrepreneurship. To examine the two hypotheses, we conduct 
regression analyses on the firm’s profit with initial asset and entrepreneurship 
proxy as independent variables. We also include the interaction of the above 
two independent variables and other factors such as capital, labour and 
individual characteristics of entrepreneurs in the regression. Among which, 
“risk-taking” is used to proxy for entrepreneurship, as we believe Wenzhou 
entrepreneurs are generally more risk-taking due to cultural, historical and 
sociological reasons.   
 
Our empirical results show that entrepreneurship, initial asset and years of 
schooling have significantly positive impact on entrepreneurial earnings. We 
also find that initial financial constraint would become no longer restrictive as 
time goes by, and entrepreneurship can to some extent, overcome the initial 
financial constraint. By relevant case studies, we have demonstrated how 
entrepreneurship helped overcome financial constraints in the long run for 




Last but not least, we find it intriguing to discover that Wenzhou displays a 
unique model of industrialization of private sector with special background in 
the transitional economy. Wenzhou entrepreneurs succeeded on breaking 
through the old system with self-induced institutional innovation. Specifically, 
with proper support from local government, they did well in dealing with 
ownership issues in a relatively discriminative climate against “privatization” 
and took the lead in the nationwide reform.  
 
We conclude with some words of caution and suggestions for possible future 
research. In our empirical work, we measure entrepreneurs’ risk-taking by 
their firms’ revenue/asset volatility, which was computed as the standard 
variation (STDEV) and mean absolute deviation (MAD) of firm-level 
revenues over total assets from their industry average in an available time 
frame. In view of the family-based governance structure of Wenzhou firms, 
such as measure does reflect entrepreneurs’ risk-taking from firm’s operations 
perspective. However, it would be more accurate if there were comprehensive 
psychological tests conducted in the survey to evaluate the founder’s 
risk-taking propensity, so that we could combine them with the said risk 
measure into our evaluation, making “risk-taking” a more complete proxy for 
entrepreneurship. While entrepreneurship could consist of other features such 
as innovation, needs for achievement, etc, it is not academically feasible to 
include all these into one measurement, as it will be hard to justify their 
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interconnections. Moreover, we use the initial asset of the firm to measure 
entrepreneur’s financial constraint. Although this measure takes into account 
their possible financing channels, which is an equilibrium outcome of their 
personal wealth, network and the local financial deepening rate, none of these 
factors’ impact could be specified. If the survey could have included detailed 
information such as entrepreneur’s personal wealth, or rough count of their 
family wealth, it would be interesting to identify each factor’s influence on 
their entrepreneurial activities.  
 
Our study is based on a probabilistic survey conducted in 2006, the time 
before the 2008 financial crises. While it brings in perspectives on how 
Wenzhou entrepreneurs stood out and succeeded in the transitional reforming 
background, further work on the sustainability of Wenzhou model in the recent 
times or future decades would be useful. Studies may be conducted on 
whether some old patterns of entrepreneurial activities, such as 
relationship-based lending are still feasible when there is an increasing number 
of “escaping” Wenzhou bosses in the post-crisis era. It is also worth looking 
into whether there are bottlenecks for Wenzhou entrepreneurs to transform 
from institutional innovators to real technology innovators. An interesting 
survey may be designed to discover the constraints or success of recent 
Wenzhou enterprises, so as to identify new mechanisms behind their evolution 
and develop implications that keep pace with times. When the patterns of 
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entrepreneurship change over time, new proxies for entrepreneurship may 
apply.  
 
On the other hand, unavoidably, the survey we relied on is subject to selection 
bias. As firms that were out of business were no longer contactable, it is biased 
towards more successful enterprises and entrepreneurs. We are able to 
compare among existing firms on the impact of financial constraint and 
entrepreneurship on their profit, but it is impossible to distinguish such impact 
on successful entrepreneurs and losers. If future surveyors manage to 
interview those “losers”, the findings could be more meaningful. Moreover, it 
is even harder but always worthwhile to involve non-entrepreneurs in the 
survey, so as to identify key factors that determined Wenzhou people’s 
occupational choice. Thus, a broader survey, although much more difficult to 
conduct, could enrich our understanding of Wenzhou entrepreneurship and 
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